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1. Introduction
Economic surplus is often created through a joint pro-
duction process, which raises the question of how
to share the joint proceeds. Since ex ante contrac-
tual solutions are not always feasible or prone to
renegotiation (Ledyard 2008), parties often have to
negotiate the distribution of the proceeds ex post. In
such bargaining a fair distribution may be difficult to
determine because the exact relative contributions of
different parties may not be fully disclosed. Exogenous
shocks to the production process may additionally
increase uncertainties regarding relative contributions.
Examples of negotiation conflicts that have (at least
partly) been induced by such uncertainties range from
the U.S. National Basketball League (NBA),1 to the
1 In the season of 1998–1999, NBA players were on strike for 191 days.
In the conflict the main point at issue was the relative contributions
of players and owners to the enormous growth of the NBA league at
that time (Schiesel 2008).
computer gaming industry,2 to more general labor
disputes.3
Another important aspect of such conflicts is that
negotiators often bring subjective entitlements to the
bargaining table, which may be derived from their real
or perceived contributions to the joint surplus. In most
cases such entitlements are mutually inconsistent and
self-servingly biased, which may hamper finding an
agreement that all involved parties find acceptable. (For
effects of mutual inconsistency, see, e.g., Hoffman and
Spitzer 1985, Burrows and Loomes 1994, Hoffman et al.
1994, Gächter and Riedl 2005); and for self-serving
2 In 2008 the conflict between a voice actor and the owning company
of Grand Theft Auto IV—then the fastest-selling computer game in
history—caught media attention. The voice actor and the company
haggled about the relative contributions of the “human performance”
and the “conception of the art director” to the success of the game
(Ortutay 2008, Totilo 2008).
3 See, e.g., Corfman and Schmeltzer (2002) and Lyons (2009) for
public accounts of discussions and disputes about how to share the
burden between white collar and blue collar workers or between
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bias, e.g., Messick and Sentis 1979, Thompson and
Loewenstein 1992, Babcock et al. 1995b, 1996, Charness
and Haruvy 2000, Buchan et al. 2004, Gächter and
Riedl 2005, and Luhan et al. 2013.)
Although performance information, production
uncertainties, and subjective entitlements are consid-
ered as important variables affecting negotiations, there
is yet no systematic investigation of how differences in
performance information and the production process
affect subjective entitlements, which in turn may influ-
ence bargaining over a jointly produced surplus. In
this paper we use laboratory experiments to provide
comprehensive evidence on this question.4
In the experiment, pairs of subjects produce a joint
surplus by individually performing a real-effort task.
The size of the surplus depends on the total perfor-
mance of both parties involved. Thereafter negotiations
over how to share the surplus take place in a com-
pletely symmetric free-form bargaining environment.
In the case that bargainers agree on a split of the
surplus, they earn their respective shares. In the case
of disagreement, they earn nothing.
Subjective entitlements are defined as “subjectively
perceived rights that go along with a motivational
disposition to defend them” (Schlicht 1998, p. 24). In our
experiment subjects may derive such subjective rights to
a fair share of the surplus from their performance in the
real-effort task. To elicit these subjective entitlements,
we privately and anonymously ask bargainers what
they think a fair distribution of the jointly produced
surplus should be from the vantage point of a neutral
arbitrator. We ask this question after the size of the
surplus is known but before bargaining begins.
Previous research has shown that entitlements can be
important in bargaining (see references above). In this
paper we proceed beyond these studies and investigate
how performance information and production uncer-
tainties affect entitlements and how they in turn impact
negotiations. To this end, we manipulate performance
information and production in the following way. First,
4 Our study is also related to the literature exploring distribution
behavior in environments with joint production. Gantner et al.
(2001) show that fairness judgments influence the distribution of
the surplus in simple ultimatum and demand games. Cherry et al.
(2002), Frohlich et al. (2004), and Cappelen et al. (2007) investigate
how a dictator’s distribution decisions depend on contributions to
the production of the surplus. Camerer and Loewenstein (1993),
Babcock et al. (1995a), and Loewenstein and Moore (2004) study
the effect of information in bargaining and show that information
disclosure does not necessarily facilitate bargaining. Wittig et al.
(1981) report that people allocate more to themselves when they are
told that their own contribution to the joint surplus is not due to
luck but due to their performance. See Karagözoğlu (2012) for a
comprehensive survey. Our study also relates to work comparing
different bargaining rules and procedures (e.g., Gächter and Riedl
2006, Gantner et al. 2013) and investigating the role of asymmetries
in coordination games (Crawford et al. 2008).
negotiators either learn whether they have been the
better or worse performer in their pair or they do
not receive this information. In the former case we
deliberately do not give precise performance infor-
mation because such information is also usually not
known in the field. Second, in one condition negotiators
know that the joint surplus is solely due to their joint
performance, whereas in another condition the actual
size of the pie is also affected by an exogenous random
event.
Crossing these conditions gives a 2 × 2 experimental
design with which we can study important issues in
bargaining. First, we can investigate which entitlements
bargainers derive from their performance in the joint
production task and whether these entitlements are
self-servingly biased. Research on accountability (e.g.,
Konow 1996, Cappelen et al. 2007) states that a person’s
entitlement should only be related to variables an agent
controls. From that perspective one may expect that
entitlements emerge only when there is performance
information, i.e., that they are performance specific,
and weaker when there are production uncertainties.
Second, when subjective entitlements are mutually
inconsistent, an agreement can be reached only when
at least one bargaining party concedes. Therefore,
entitlements likely affect bargaining but the strength of
the effect may depend on performance information
and production uncertainties, because entitlements
themselves are likely influenced by them. With our
experimental design we can track the influence of
entitlements and their interaction with performance
information and production uncertainties through the
whole negotiation process, beginning with opening
offers, via concessions and bargaining duration, to
agreements.
It should be noted that performance information
in our experiment is relatively coarse, which may
make it difficult for negotiators to derive subjective
entitlements at all. Moreover, in contrast to previous
research (Gächter and Riedl 2005), our performance
information also does not provide claims that could be
used as an anchor for subjective entitlements. Therefore,
we consider our set-up as a rather conservative test
bed for the existence of subjective entitlements as well
as their potential impact on bargaining.
Our main results are the following. First, bargain-
ers undoubtedly derive subjective entitlements from
the performance task, but only when there is relative
performance information. Second, entitlements are per-
formance specific because better performers derive
stronger entitlements than worse performers. In addi-
tion, within bargaining pairs, entitlements are mostly
mutually inconsistent. Third, perhaps surprisingly,
uncertainties in the production process only weakly
affect subjective entitlements. Fourth, the existence and
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whole bargaining process. They impact opening offers
and agreements because those are skewed away from
the equal split and correlated with subjective entitle-
ments. Further bargaining takes longer and concessions
are smaller, and both are correlated with the tension in
entitlements in a bargaining pair. Hence, we find that
the (in)existence and strength of subjective entitlements
strongly depends on the information negotiators have
and that derived subjective entitlements systematically
influence the whole bargaining process. Fifth, produc-
tion uncertainties about the translation of performance
into surplus do affect bargaining (opening proposals,
concessions, bargaining duration, and frequency of
equal splits) but do not systematically mitigate the
effect of entitlements on bargaining. Moreover, although
all bargaining pairs received the same coarse relative
performance information, individual and pair-level
differences in entitlements correlate with all aspects of
bargaining. This strongly suggests that entitlements per
se are important factors shaping the bargaining process.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 presents the experimental design and procedures.
Section 3 develops our research hypotheses, partly
based on theoretical bargaining models. Section 4 con-
tains the results. Section 5 summarizes our findings
and puts them into perspective, especially in relation




In our experiment, randomly and anonymously paired
subjects take on the role of department heads of a
company. Subjects are informed that their firm has a
standard “salary budget” of 2,050 points available for
them and that this budget can change depending on
their performances and (in some treatments) external
factors. They are further told that the top management
of the firm does not want to impose a salary distribution
and that they will have to bargain over the distribution
of the salary budget.
Our experiment was not framed neutrally for the
following reasons. First, our experimental set-up is
relatively complex: it involves a real-effort task, elicita-
tion of entitlements, unstructured bargaining, and—
depending on the treatment—different forms of perfor-
mance information and uncertainties in the production
process. Providing an explicit natural context might
have helped subjects to understand the rules and
incentives in the experiment. Second, laboratory experi-
ments are sometimes criticized for their lack of external
validity. This may hold especially for neutrally framed
experiments. Providing an explicit natural frame in a
laboratory experiment may increase external validity
without compromising internal validity. Therefore,
Table 1 Sequence of Events
1. Reading of instructions
2. Performance task
3. Outcome determination
4. Elicitation of beliefs about performances
5. Relative performance informationa
6. Elicitation of subjective entitlements
7. Bargaining
8. Postexperiment questionnaireb
aThis information is provided only in the Info treatments.
bBefore stage 8 there was another bargaining experiment that was not
preannounced; the results of this stage are reported elsewhere.
the chosen frame reveals insights about the role of
entitlements in negotiations that may be more relevant
for actual negotiations in companies and other orga-
nizations than results found under a neutral frame.
Third, we use the same frame as Gächter and Riedl
(2005), allowing us to make direct comparisons with
their results on the effect of entitlements.
In the experiment we vary (i) the information that
subjects receive about their own and the other depart-
ment head’s performance in a real-effort task and
(ii) the way these performances are translated into the
salary budget, as explained below. Table 1 summarizes
the main elements of the experiment in the sequence in
which they were presented to the subjects. In the fol-
lowing we describe these elements and our treatments
in detail.
Performance and Outcome Determination. After read-
ing the instructions aloud, the performance of each
department head is determined with a real-effort task
for which we use a version of a general-knowledge
quiz that has successfully been applied in other studies
(Hoffman et al. 1994, Clark 1998, Gächter and Riedl
2005). The quiz consists of 16 multiple-choice questions
with four incorrect and one correct answer to each
question. The questions concern a variety of fields of
knowledge, such as politics, music, religion, astronomy,
and geography. Each participant receives the same set
of questions in the same order. Subjects have at most
30 seconds to answer each question and unanswered
questions count as wrong answers. All this information
is public knowledge.
Before the subjects take the quiz, in the two treatments
with deterministic production (called Info-Det and
Noinfo-Det), it is explained to them that the salary
budget in a pair will be 1,390 points in case of both
department heads having in sum 0 to 10 correct answers,
2,050 points in case of 11 to 20 correct answers, and
2,710 points in case of 21 to 32 correct answers. In the
two treatments with uncertainty in production (called
Info-Unc and Noinfo-Unc), subjects are informed that
with a chance of 25% their salary budget is determined
by their joint performances (as described above) and that
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chosen with equal probability.5 In all treatments, subjects
get to know the actually produced salary budget before
bargaining.
Elicitation of Beliefs on Performances. Knowing the
salary budget, each subject is asked to guess the number
of her (or his) own as well as the other department
head’s number of correct answers. This belief elicitation
is incentivized: for each precise estimation, a subject
earns 60 points; for each estimation with 1 (2) error(s),
a subject earns 30 (15) points; and for estimates with
larger errors, a subject does not earn any payoff.
Relative Performance Information. In one pair of treat-
ments, subjects do not receive any information about
their performances in the quiz (Noinfo-Unc and
Noinfo-Det), whereas in another pair of treatments
subjects get to know whether they are the better or
worse performer in their pair (Info-Unc and Info-Det).
In each pair, a head of department is called the bet-
ter (worse) performer for getting more (less) correct
answers.6 In case of a tie, subjects are also informed
about that.
Elicitation of Subjective Entitlements. We elicit subjec-
tive entitlements by adopting the elicitation question
used by Gächter and Riedl (2005) (see also Babcock et al.
1995b). Specifically, all subjects answer the following
question:
According to your opinion, what would be a “fair”
distribution of the salary budget from the vantage point
of a noninvolved neutral arbitrator? (Please use exact
amounts; no intervals! The amounts have to sum up to
the salary budget!)
Subjects are not informed about this question before-
hand. In the Noinfo treatments, they see and answer it
after they have stated their beliefs about performances,
5 In the Unc treatments, subjects do not get to know whether it
was actually luck or their joint performance that determined the
salary budget. We have made this design choice for the following
reasons. First, in many actual bargaining situations over a jointly
produced surplus, negotiators often do not know to what extent
the realized outcome is due to their own performance and to
what extent it is due to other (random) factors (see the examples
discussed in §1). Second, if we had informed subjects about whether
or not their joint performance mattered, we would have effectively
introduced two treatments. One treatment, where subjects would
have known for sure that it was their performance that determined
the surplus, would have been equivalent to our treatments with
deterministic production, and we would expect similar results. The
other treatment, where they would have known for sure that it was
not their performance that determined the surplus, would have
been equivalent to a production process completely determined by
chance. In this case we would expect little effect of entitlements and
mostly 50/50 agreements, as in the implemented Unc treatments
(see also our hypotheses below).
6 We present this information after eliciting beliefs on performances
because (i) we do not want beliefs to be affected by performance
information, and (ii) in this way we keep symmetry in belief
elicitation between the Info and Noinfo treatments.
and in the Info treatments they see and answer it after
they have received the relative performance informa-
tion. Hence, subjects’ fairness judgments likely depend
on their (believed) relative performance, and elicited
entitlements are therefore considered subjective.
Bargaining. Each pair of department heads bargains
over the distribution of their salary budget. If an agree-
ment is reached within 10 minutes, both earn the agreed
shares. If no agreement is reached they are informed
that they are to be “fired” by the management of the
firm and do not earn anything. We implement free-form
bargaining (like, e.g., Roth and Murnighan 1982, Gächter
and Riedl 2005), because it is a natural bargaining pro-
tocol, avoids exogenous first-mover effects, and gives
subjects much freedom in bargaining (e.g., in the timing,
sequence, and number of proposals). Subjects are seated
in computer cubicles and bargain anonymously with
their opponents over a computer network by sending
proposals that consist of an amount for themselves and
an amount for the other department head.7
Postexperiment Questionnaire and Payout. After all
parts of the experiment are finished, subjects answer a
questionnaire where we ask them about their opinion
on the general knowledge quiz, among other questions.
They are also presented with the Machiavelli personal-
ity test (Christie 1970), a risk-attitude questionnaire
(Dohmen et al. 2011), and questions about their per-
sonal background. Thereafter, subjects are paid their
earnings in cash individually and confidentially.
The experiment was computerized and programmed
with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and con-
ducted in the BEElab (Behavioral and Experimental
Economics Laboratory) of Maastricht University in
April 2009 and February 2010. In total 348 subjects par-
ticipated in 16 randomized experimental sessions. Most
subjects were undergraduates in economics, business,
and international business. A typical session lasted
approximately 90 minutes. The points earned in the
experiment were converted into cash with an exchange
rate of 100 points equalling 65 euro cents. The average
earnings (including a lump-sum show-up fee of E3, –)
were approximately E16, –.
3. Research Hypotheses
We are interested in the existence and strength of sub-
jective entitlements over a jointly produced surplus
and how such entitlements are affected by performance
information and production uncertainties. Further, in
case entitlements do emerge, we want to investigate
how they influence the bargaining process under the
described information and production conditions. In
this section we develop some hypotheses regarding
these issues.
7 Detailed bargaining instructions and example computer screens can
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3.1. Subjective Entitlements
In our experiment, subjective entitlements are expressed
as subjectively perceived fair shares of the jointly
produced surplus. Therefore, we will say that a subjec-
tive entitlement exists when the perceived fair share is
larger than the equal split and will call an entitlement
stronger the more it deviates from the equal split.
We investigate two exogenous factors that could
affect subjective entitlements, relative performance
information and noise in the process producing the joint
surplus. The literature on accountability (e.g., Konow
1996) argues that subjective entitlements can emerge
only when an agent has control over the variables
affecting outcomes. In our experiment it is perfor-
mance in the quiz over which subjects have control,
and this performance also affects the salary budget.
Therefore, accountability theory suggests that subjec-
tive entitlements will emerge when the production
process is deterministic (Det treatments). When the
production process is influenced by exogenous factors
(Unc treatments), production cannot unambiguously be
attributed to performance and the role of desert is more
controversial (Bazerman and Neale 1992). Experimental
evidence (e.g., Hoffman and Spitzer 1985) has also
shown that people often care more about effort than
about luck. Together with accountability theory, this
implies that subjective entitlements should be weaker
or even absent when there is noise in production.
Information about relative performance may also
influence subjective entitlements. Research on attribu-
tion and motivational biases in performance evaluation
has shown that people consistently attribute successes
to internal factors (i.e., to one’s own performance),
whereas failures are attributed to both internal and
external factors (Zuckerman 1979, Babcock et al. 1995b,
Duval and Silvia 2002). In the context of our experi-
ment, this implies that high performers should have
a tendency to attribute stronger entitlements to them-
selves than low performers do and vice versa. Such
performance-specific entitlements are only possible if
one has at least relative performance information. There-
fore, entitlements should emerge in treatments with
performance information (Info). These entitlements
may be moderated by uncertainties in the translation
of performance into outcomes because then the pro-
duced surplus can less easily be attributed to one’s own
performance. We summarize our considerations in the
following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 (Subjective Entitlements, Perfor-
mance Information, and Production Uncertain-
ties). (i) Subjects exhibit subjective entitlements when
production is deterministic (Det). These entitlements are
weaker or absent when there is noise in the production
process (Unc).
(ii) Subjects exhibit performance-specific subjective enti-
tlements when performance information is available (Info).
Better performers attribute stronger entitlements to them-
selves than worse performers attribute to better performers.
(iii) Performance-specific subjective entitlements are
stronger when the production process is deterministic (Info-
Det) than when there is production uncertainty (Info-Unc).
3.2. Subjective Entitlements and Bargaining
In our free-form bargaining, subjects’ strategy sets are
extremely rich, and to our knowledge there is no theo-
retical model that could predict behavior in the whole
bargaining process (i.e., first proposals, concessions,
and bargaining duration) and agreements as well as
the influence of subjective entitlements. However, there
is some theoretical literature that analyzes bargaining
situations that may be viewed as similar to ours and,
hence, can be informative about what to expect in our
bargaining experiment.
When predicting agreements in unstructured bar-
gaining, classical cooperative bargaining solutions are
often employed (see, e.g., Nash 1950 and Kalai and
Smorodinsky 1975 for theoretical solutions; see, e.g.,
Roth 1995 for early experimental evidence). Importantly,
these solutions are completely determined by the utility
set and disagreement point and ignore any form of
entitlements. In our experiment the bargaining parties
are symmetric from a strategic point of view. Therefore,
all such solutions predict an equal split of the produced
surplus, irrespective of entitlements and treatment.
The bankruptcy and bargaining with claims literature
has introduced objective entitlements in the form of
claims into bargaining theory (see Thomson 2003 for
an overview and Gächter and Riedl 2006 for an exper-
iment). More closely related to our bargaining with
subjective entitlements are models using reference and
ideal points (Gupta and Livne 1988, Balakrishnan et al.
2011). In these models the ideal point is exogenously
defined via the disagreement point. In our bargaining
environment we can define the ideal point endoge-
nously via subjective entitlements. All these models
predict a correlation between entitlements (subjective
or objective) and bargaining agreements. Specifically,
the stronger the entitlement of a negotiator, the larger
the share of the surplus this negotiator can secure,
given the entitlement of the other negotiator.
Recently, Birkeland and Tungodden (2014) developed
a bargaining model that explicitly takes entitlements
(“fairness principles” in their terminology) into account.
They incorporate entitlements as variables in the asym-
metric Nash bargaining solution and show that the
negotiator with stronger entitlements (and with a higher
willingness to defend them) generally receives a larger
share of the pie. Hence, this model also predicts a
positive correlation between strength of entitlement
and received share in bargaining.8 Moreover, and in
8 In a related model, Bolton and Karagözoğlu (2012) modify the
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contrast to cooperative bargaining models, Birkeland
and Tungodden (2014) show that incompatible sub-
jective entitlements can lead to disagreement when
bargainers attach sufficient weight to their entitlements.
Their result implies that the likelihood of disagreement
increases with the tension in subjective entitlements
between bargainers.
In case there are no entitlements, the discussed
models predict the equal split. The equal split is also
predicted when subjective entitlements of bargaining
partners are symmetric around it. This prediction is
consistent with the long strand of literature on the
prevalence of the equal split in (almost) symmetric
bargaining environments (e.g., Schelling 1960; Siegel
and Fouraker 1960; Nydegger and Owen 1975; Roth
and Malouf 1979; Anbarci and Feltovich 2013, 2014).
Together with our hypothesis on the emergence
and strength of subjective entitlements, the discussed
theoretical models provide us with a useful framework
for qualitative and comparative statics predictions. We
can distinguish two effects of subjective entitlements
on bargaining agreements that may differ across treat-
ments. First, there could be a level effect, in the sense
that the existence of entitlements leads to bargaining
agreements different from the equal split. Specifically,
since we hypothesize that subjective entitlements will
differ in strength across treatments (Hypothesis 1(i)), we
expect that agreements will also similarly differ across
treatments. Moreover, if entitlements are indeed perfor-
mance specific (Hypothesis 1(ii)) and influenced by the
production process (Hypothesis 1(iii)), this should also
be reflected in bargaining agreements. Second, there
may also be a marginal effect of entitlements, implying
that bargaining agreements within each treatment are
correlated with the entitlements subjects in a bargaining
pair hold. In principle, such a marginal effect could be
similar in different treatments. However, as argued
above, in the Unc treatments, entitlements are likely
weaker than in the Det treatments. In this case, or
if there are no entitlements at all (as we expect to
be the case in the Noinfo treatments), the marginal
effect of entitlements may be weakened or nonexistent.
Third, in line with the theoretical results reported in
Birkeland and Tungodden (2014), in those treatments
where strong entitlements occur, they may even lead to
disagreements. The following hypothesis, which is con-
ditional on the observation of entitlements as described
in Hypothesis 1, captures these considerations.
Hypothesis 2 (Subjective Entitlements and Bar-
gaining (Dis)Agreements). (i) When there is no per-
formance information (Noinfo), agreements do not differ
from the equal split. With performance information (Info),
asymmetric focal points. They show that agreements should lie
between these focal points.
agreements do differ from the equal split in favor of the better
performer and deviate more when production is deterministic
(Info-Det) than when it is noisy (Info-Unc).
(ii) Moreover, with performance information (Info),
agreements are positively correlated with each bargain-
ing partner’s subjective entitlement, and the correlation
is stronger without production uncertainty (Info-Det)
than with it (Info-Unc). Without performance information,
no such correlation exists (Noinfo).
(iii) Disagreements are more frequent in the Info-Det
treatment than in the Info-Unc treatment and do not occur
when there is no performance information (Noinfo).
Recent theoretical bargaining models (Compte and
Jehiel 2003, Li 2007, Hyndman 2011) can account for
the fact that bargaining agreement is almost never
immediate but rather follows a gradual process of
offers, counteroffers, and concessions. However, these
models are not rich enough to be used for predictions
of how entitlements will affect important elements
of the bargaining process, such as opening proposals,
concession behavior, and bargaining duration. We,
therefore, refrain from formulating specific hypotheses
regarding these elements of the bargaining process.
Intuitively, however, it seems reasonable that entitle-
ments have similar effects on the bargaining process as
on agreements.
Opening proposals set the stage for the rest of the
bargaining process and are likely influenced by strategic
considerations. Nevertheless, if performance-specific
entitlements are strongly present, they may also be
reflected in these first proposals. Specifically, when
negotiators anticipate that they have to make some
compromises during bargaining and when their target
outcome is related to derived and ascribed entitlements,
these may influence their opening proposals in a simi-
lar way as agreements. Entitlements may also affect
concessions and bargaining duration. If entitlements
are weak and bargaining partners view the equal split
as the natural focal point to agree upon, there is lit-
tle reason for much haggling and long negotiations.
However, if entitlements are strong, incompatible nego-
tiators should be ready to defend them and not give
in easily when the other side has a different view on
matters. In that case, concessions may build in later
and only in small steps, and bargaining will take longer.
Hence, we expect that across treatments concessions
and bargaining duration will be influenced by subjec-
tive entitlements in a similar way as agreements are.
This influence will be the more pronounced the farther
apart individual entitlements within a pair are, i.e., the
larger the tension in entitlements is.
4. Results
In the following we refer to the subject with the better
performance (i.e., more correct answers in the perfor-
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subject as the “loser.” Further, we express entitlements,
proposals, and agreements in shares to the winner
(“winner share”).
On average subjects answered 7 of the 16 questions
correctly, indicating that the questions were neither too
easy nor too difficult. In addition, subjects’ answers to
postexperiment questions show that they perceived the
performance quiz as a legitimate measure of general
knowledge.9 Subjects’ estimates of their own and their
partner’s number of correct answers were, with 7026
and 7054, respectively, pretty accurate.10 This is in
concordance with other studies also reporting no or
little overconfidence at success levels around 50%
(Moore and Healy 2008, Blavatskyy 2009).
In total we have data of 174 bargaining pairs. The
salary budget of 1,390, 2,050, and 2,710 points occurred
in 55, 81, and 38 pairs, respectively. Across salary
budgets we do not find statistically significant differ-
ences in the variables of interest.11 Therefore, in the
subsequent statistical analysis we pool the data of the
different salary budget sizes.
4.1. Subjective Entitlements
Figure 1 depicts the distribution of subjective entitle-
ments as stated by winners and losers, pooled across
treatments. Entitlements are shown as shares to the
winner (winner shares), and losers’ entitlements should
be read as the entitlement that losers ascribe to winners.
It shows that, for winners as well as losers, subjective
entitlements are skewed in the hypothesized way. In the
pooled data the average subjective entitlement stated by
winners and losers is 00572 and 00544, respectively. For
both roles, Wilcoxon signed-ranks (WSR) tests indicate
that entitlements are significantly larger than the equal
split (p < 000001, two-sided).12 The difference in stated
entitlements between winners and losers is significant
(p < 000001, WSR test), indicating performance-specific
entitlements.13
9 On a 7-point Likert-scale (1 = “do not agree at all,” 7 = “agree very
much”), the average (median) answer to the statement “In my view
the knowledge questions have been difficult” was 5010 (5), and to
“The one with the better general knowledge is able to answer more
questions correctly” was 5042 (6).
10 The difference is statistically significant (p = 000151, Wilcoxon
signed-ranks test, two-sided) but small in quantitative terms.
11 Two-sided Kruskal–Wallis rank-sum tests do not reject the hypothe-
ses of equality across salary budget sizes for subjective entitlements
of both winners and losers, separately and pooled, (p > 004755),
bargaining durations (p = 005961), and agreements (p = 005374).
12 For convenience we report two-sided tests throughout. Because
some of our hypotheses are one-sided, our statistical analysis can be
seen as rather conservative in these cases.
13 By definition, there are no losers and winners in pairs where
subjects performed equally well in the performance task (22 pairs).
Not surprisingly, there is no difference in entitlements within such
pairs (absolute difference is smaller than 00001). Therefore, here and
in the following analyses, we do not take into account the data of
these pairs.
Table 2 Subjective Entitlements Stated by Winners and Losers in
Each Treatment
Noinfo-Unc Noinfo-Det Info-Unc Info-Det
Winner 00533 00548 00594 00619
4000645 4000915 4000605 4000795
Loser 00572 00542 00523 00533
4001045 4000555 4000395 4000565
Difference −00039 −00006 00071 00086
4001255 4001015 4000595 4001085
No. of obs. 43 35 37 37
Notes. The table reports averages and average differences, respectively.
Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
To test our Hypotheses 1, we analyze winners’ and
losers’ entitlements separately for the four treatments.
The descriptive statistics reported in Table 2 show
that subjective entitlements of winners and losers vary
across treatments. Winners’ subjective entitlements are
stronger with performance information than without
it. A Kruskal–Wallis (KW) test indicates significant
differences across treatments (p = 000001). Subsequent
pairwise comparisons with Mann–Whitney (MW) tests
show that the differences between the Noinfo-Unc
and Noinfo-Det treatments, as well as between the
Info-Unc and Info-Det treatments, are not significant
(p = 009671 and 002398, respectively). At the same time,
comparisons of the Noinfo with the Info treatments
show significant differences (p < 000001) in all pairwise
comparisons. For losers a KW test detects differences
across treatments at the marginal significance level
(p = 000521). Pairwise comparisons using MW tests
show that differences in the production process do
not affect entitlements in either information condition
(Noinfo-Unc versus Noinfo-Det: p= 002644; Info-
Unc versus Info-Det: p = 001805). In contrast, perfor-
mance information does influence losers’ entitlements
when the production process is noisy (Noinfo-Unc
versus Info-Unc: p = 000104) but not when it is deter-
ministic (Noinfo-Det versus Info-Det: p = 005711).
Hence, for winners and losers, performance-specific
entitlements are strengthened by performance infor-
mation but unaffected by the production process. The
effects on losers’ entitlements are less pronounced,
however.
Analyses of the differences between winner and
loser entitlements across and within treatments fur-
ther supports the idea that it is mainly performance
information that strengthens performance-specific enti-
tlements (see lower part of Table 2). Comparisons
across treatments show that there are no significant dif-
ferences between both Noinfo treatments or between
both Info treatments (p≥ 004873), whereas all other
pairwise differences are significant (p ≤ 000002). Within
treatments, WSR tests indicate that differences between
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Note. Bin width is 0.05.
when performance information is available (Info-Unc:
p < 000001; Info-Det: p < 000001) but fail to detect sig-
nificant differences in treatments without performance
information (p ≥ 001754). In the Noinfo treatments,
the belief of being a better or worse performer may
induce entitlements. To explore this possibility, we
compare subjective entitlements of “belief-winners”
and “belief-losers” (i.e., bargainers who believe to
have more and fewer answers correct than the paired
subject). In the Noinfo-Det treatment, the average
subjective entitlements of belief-winners (005921n= 18)
and belief-losers (005321n= 30) indeed significantly
differ (p = 000445), whereas in the Noinfo-Unc treat-
ment, they are virtually the same (005471n= 34 and
005501n = 46, respectively; p = 007534). Hence, only
when production is deterministic is there evidence in
favor of belief-based performance-specific entitlements.
In summary, the data support the hypothesis that
performance-specific entitlements are established when
there is performance information. Entitlements also
exist without performance information, especially for
those who believe themselves to be better performers,
but only when production is deterministic. Notably,
given performance information, noise in the production
process has little to no effect on performance-specific
subjective entitlements.
4.2. Bargaining and Subjective Entitlements
In the previous subsection we showed that performance-
specific subjective entitlements exist and that they
emerge especially when there is performance infor-
mation. Yet, as such, entitlements are cheap talk and
will be economically relevant in bargaining only when
negotiators are ready to defend them. In the following
subsections we look into this issue and explore the
effect of entitlements on the whole bargaining process:
opening proposals, concessions, bargaining duration,
and agreements.
4.2.1. Opening Proposals. Depending on who
makes the first move, in each pair the very first pro-
posal comes either from a winner or a loser. Table 3
shows summary statistics of these opening proposals.
The figures in the table show that in each treatment
winners demand significantly higher shares for them-
selves than losers are offering them (in all treatments
p ≤ 000001).
As expected, across treatments, opening proposals are
influenced by performance information and the nature
of the production process. The lower part of Table 3
shows the average distances of opening proposals from
the equal split. In the Noinfo-Unc treatment, these dis-
tances are close to symmetrical for winners and losers,
and a MW test does not reject the hypothesis of equal
absolute distance from the equal split (p = 006332). In
the other treatments, winner and loser opening propos-
als are skewed toward the winner (p < 000028). Further,
a KW test indicates that opening proposals of winners
Table 3 Opening Proposals Made by Winners and Losers in Each
Treatment (Winner Shares)
Noinfo-Unc Noinfo-Det Info-Unc Info-Det
Winner 00588 00598 00642 00692
4001115 4001045 4000675 4001265
No. of obs. 20 18 18 23
Loser 00408 00482 00450 00479
4000895 4000355 4001245 4000815
No. of obs. 23 17 19 14
Distances from equal split:
Winner 00088 00098 00142 00192
Loser −00092 −00018 −00050 −00021
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Table 4 Concessions and Bargaining Duration in Each Treatment
Noinfo-Unc Noinfo-Det Info-Unc Info-Det
Concessions 52908 49207 30402 21302
4392055 4372015 4470035 4244085
No. of obs. 43 35 37 37
Bargaining 26903 27100 39501 49306
duration 4219065 4236095 4209065 4186015
No. of obs. 43 34 36 35
Notes. The table reports averages. Concessions (duration) statistics include
(exclude) pairs that disagree. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
significantly differ across treatments (p = 000009). Pair-
wise comparisons between treatments fail to detect
significant differences between both Noinfo treatments
and both Info treatments (p = 006907 and p = 002308,
respectively) but indicate significant differences when
varying performance information while keeping the
production process constant (p ≤ 000084). For losers a
KW test indicates significant differences in opening
proposals across treatments (p = 000005). MW tests
reveal a significant difference between the Det and
Unc treatments when there is no performance informa-
tion (p= 000008) but not when there is performance
information (p = 001144). Varying performance infor-
mation affects opening offers significantly only when
there is noise in the production process (Noinfo-Unc
versus Info-Unc: p = 000038; Noinfo-Det versus Info-
Det: p = 001503). When comparing opening proposals
between the Noinfo treatments, we find that belief-
winners as well as belief-losers ask significantly more
when production is deterministic than when it is noisy
(winners: 00621 and 00483, p = 000030; losers: 00565 and
00464, p = 000040). This is consistent with the stronger
performance-specific entitlements of belief-winners and
belief-losers for deterministic production.
Overall, these results confirm a level effect of entitle-
ments on opening proposals that differs across treat-
ments. Winners ask for more when there is performance
information than when this information is not available.
Without performance information, subjects ask for
more when production is deterministic than when it is
uncertain, irrespective of whether they believe to be
better or worse performers. Further, given performance
information, opening offers appear to be more strongly
skewed toward winners when the production process
is deterministic than when it is noisy.
To investigate whether there is also a marginal effect
of entitlements on opening proposals, we run Tobit
regressions for each treatment.14 As expected, in both
treatments with performance information, opening
proposals are significantly and positively affected by
subjective entitlements. Those who state a stronger
14 To save space, we discuss these results rather informally here; for
the detailed regression results, see Table A.1 in the appendix.
entitlement also demand a higher proportion of the
salary budget. Unexpectedly, the effect of entitlements
does not significantly differ between the Info-Unc and
Info-Det treatments. Without performance information,
entitlements do not play a significant role for opening
offers. In sum, entitlements exhibit a strong marginal
effect on opening proposals only when performance
information is available. This holds irrespective of
whether or not there is noise in the production process.
4.2.2. Concessions and Bargaining Duration. To
analyze concessions in bargaining, we employ con-
cession measures introduced by Gächter and Riedl
(2005), which incorporate both the size of a conces-
sion relative to the remaining surplus, taking into
account the concessions already made, and the time
at which a concession is made. These measures are
(i) the sum of average relative concessions, (ii) the
sum of average concession times, and (iii) the sum
of average time-weighted relative concessions, where
the sum is taken over the individual statistics of the
two bargainers in a pair.15 These concession measures
summarize concession behavior on the pair level by
combining individual-level data in each pair. For the
sake of clarity, we report here only results for the most
encompassing concession statistic, the sum of average
time-weighted relative concessions (concessions, for
short), and relegate results regarding the other two
concession measures to §S1.2 in the online appendix.
15 The exact definitions are as follows (slightly adapted from Gächter
and Riedl 2005, p. 256, to fit our bargaining environment): A relative
concession of a winner is defined as the difference between a winner’s
standing offer (in winner share) and his new offer (in winner share)
divided by the current bargaining area. The current bargaining
area is given by the difference between the standing offer of the
winner (as winner share) and the standing offer of the loser (as
winner share). A relative concession of a loser is defined analogously.
For example, if the standing offers of a winner and a loser are 007
and 005, respectively (i.e., the current bargaining area is 002), and
the winner now demands only 006 for himself, then the absolute
concession is 001 and the relative concession is 005 (= 001/002). The
magnitude of 005 can be interpreted as going halfway toward an
agreement. The initial bargaining area is assumed to be equal to
the salary budget (i.e., 1). A concession leading to a new offer that
precisely matches the opponent’s standing offer gives a relative
concession of 1. Therefore, an acceptance is calculated as a relative
concession of 1. The summary statistics average relative concession of a
bargainer is just the average of all of the relative concessions made
by that bargainer during bargaining.
The average concession time of a bargainer is defined as the sum of
the points in time at which concessions are made divided by the
number of concessions.
A time-weighted relative concession is a relative concession (as defined
above) multiplied by (601-time of concession) if the concession is
positive, and multiplied by time of concession if the concession is
negative, respectively. This measure has the property that a given
positive (negative) relative concession gets less (more) weight the
later the concession is made. The statistic we use is the average of
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The upper part of Table 4 reports descriptive statistics
of concessions for all four treatments, where smaller val-
ues indicate weaker concessions (i.e., concessions that
are made later and/or are smaller). As expected, con-
cessions in bargaining differ across treatments (KW test,
p = 000001). Specifically, concessions are weaker with
than without performance information and are weakest
when performance information is combined with a
deterministic production process. Pairwise comparisons
with MW tests show that the difference between the
Noinfo treatments is insignificant (p = 009519), whereas
there are significant differences when comparing the
Noinfo and Info treatments for given production
process (p ≤ 000236). Concessions are also significantly
weaker in the Info-Det than in Info-Unc treatment
(p ≤ 000088).
The lower part of Table 4 reports descriptive statistics
for bargaining duration (i.e., the time spent until an
agreement is reached). It differs across treatments in a
similar way as concessions do (KW test, p= 000001).
Bargaining duration is shortest and almost equal in
both treatments without performance information and
it takes longest until an agreement is reached when
performance information is combined with determinis-
tic production. Pairwise comparisons with MW tests
show that equality of bargaining duration cannot be
rejected for the Noinfo treatments (p = 006961) but is
rejected for all other comparisons (p ≤ 000277).16 Hence,
overall, the data clearly support the expected level
effect of entitlements on concessions and bargaining
duration.
For testing a potential marginal effect of entitlements
on concessions and bargaining duration, we define
the tension in entitlements between losers and winners
as the difference in subjective entitlements between
winners and losers in each bargaining pair.
Next to tensions in entitlements, concessions and
bargaining duration may also be influenced by the dif-
ference in first proposals of winners and losers, because
a larger initial difference needs larger concessions for
an agreement to be struck and may also elongate the
bargaining process. Our concession measure incorpo-
rates this potential influence of opening proposals by
defining concessions relative to bargaining areas, which
are given by standing proposals. Therefore, we do not
need to control for opening offers in the concessions
regressions discussed below. When analyzing bargain-
ing duration we explicitly control for the influence of
initial proposals.17
16 We find a similar effect of entitlements on the likelihood of so-called
last-minute agreements. Details can be found in §S1.3 of the online
appendix.
17 To save space, we discuss the main results rather informally here;
for the detailed regression results, see Tables A.2 and A.3 in the
appendix.
As expected, without performance information
(Noinfo), concessions are largely unaffected by entitle-
ments but they do have an effect when performance
information is available (Info). In the latter treatments,
a larger tension in entitlements significantly weakens
concessions made in a bargaining pair. The effects
do not differ statistically significantly when there is
noise in the production process (Info-Unc) or when
production is deterministic (Info-Det).
The effects of entitlements on concessions are largely
mirrored by their effects on bargaining duration. With-
out performance information, tensions in entitlements
do not significantly affect bargaining duration, irre-
spective of the production process. With performance
information and noisy production (Info-Unc), ten-
sions in entitlements significantly increase the time
until an agreement is reached, whereas this is only
insignificantly the case for deterministic production
(Info-Det). However, in the latter treatment there is
a significantly positive effect of the difference in first
proposals on bargaining duration. Together with the
already established result of a significant effect of enti-
tlements on opening proposals, this points toward an
indirect effect of entitlements on bargaining duration
in this treatment.
In summary, without performance information,
stronger tensions in entitlements affect neither conces-
sions nor bargaining duration, but they weaken con-
cessions and increase bargaining duration (directly or
indirectly) when performance information is available.18
4.2.3. Agreements. Figure 2 shows the distribution
of agreements and Table 5 reports summary statistics for
all four treatments. Both indicate clear differences across
treatments that are confirmed by a KW test (p = 000001).
Further, applying pairwise MW tests, we find that there
are no significant differences in agreements between
both Noinfo treatments and both Info treatments (p =
007042 and p = 004071, respectively), whereas all other
pairwise differences are highly significant (p = 000001).
Figure 2 shows specifically that, without performance
information, almost all bargaining pairs agree on split-
ting the salary budget equally. In Noinfo-Unc and
Noinfo-Det treatments, respectively, 7404% and 6707%
of all agreements are exactly on the equal split, and all
other agreements are very close to it, save one outlier
in the Noinfo-Det treatment.
WSR tests confirm that in these treatments agree-
ments are not significantly different from the equal split
(p = 006636 and p = 009918, respectively). In the treat-
ments with performance information, the frequency
18 Consistent with results in other comparable free-form bargaining
experiments, we observe only few disagreements, making statisti-
cal results regarding the effect of entitlements unreliable. For the
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Note. Bin width is 0.05.
of equal splits is strongly reduced and amounts to
only 1309% in the Info-Unc and 806% in Info-Det
treatments. Consequently, WSR tests indicate that bar-
gaining pairs split their salary budget in favor of the
better performer rather than equally (p < 000001 in both
Info treatments).
In summary, in line with our results on subjective
entitlements and in accordance with Hypothesis 2,
agreements are on the equal split when there is no
performance information, but with performance infor-
mation winners receive a significantly higher share than
losers. Interestingly, agreements do not differ between
noisy and deterministic production processes. The
latter result contrasts partly with Hypothesis 2 but is in
concordance with our earlier finding that entitlements
respond to performance information but are, given the
respective performance information condition, largely
unaffected by the nature of the production process.
Next we analyze whether subjective entitlements
exhibit a marginal effect on agreements as also hypoth-
esized in Hypothesis 2. We look at two outcome
Table 5 Agreements in Each Treatment
Noinfo-Unc Noinfo-Det Info-Unc Info-Det
Agreements 00502 00511 00548 00550
4000095 4000545 4000505 4000555
No. of obs. 43 34 36 35
Notes. The table reports averages in winner shares. Standard deviations are
given in parentheses.
measures and relate winner and loser entitlements
(W_Entitle and L_Entitle) in each pair, first, to the actu-
ally agreed share and, second, to the likelihood that
the agreement deviated from the equal split.
Table 6 reports the Tobit regression results for agreed
shares. Overall we find a relatively weak marginal
effect of entitlements on agreed shares. Only in the
Info-Det treatment do entitlements of losers affect
agreements significantly (at the 10% level) as expected.
Unexpectedly, winner and loser entitlements appear
(marginally) significant in the NoInfo-Det treatment,
suggesting an entitlement effect even without perfor-
mance information. However, closer inspection reveals
Table 6 Agreements as a Function of Subjective Entitlements in Each
Treatment (Tobit Regressions)
Dependent variable: Agreed share
Independent
variables Noinfo-Unc Noinfo-Det Info-Unc Info-Det
Constant 00504∗∗∗ 00149∗ 00584∗∗∗ 00418∗∗∗
4000185 4000845 4001245 4001145
W_Entitle −00015 00490∗∗∗ 00062 00015
4000295 4001145 4001685 4001205
L_Entitle 00010 00171∗ −00139 00230∗
4000165 4000875 4001835 4001345
Log-L 14207 7607 5707 5307
F 0034 9099 0031 1050
N 43 34 36 35
Note. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.
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Table 7 Likelihood of Deviation from the Equal Split as a Function of
Subjective Entitlements in Each Treatment (Probit Regressions)
Dependent variable: Deviation from equal split
Independent
variables Noinfo-Unc Noinfo-Det Info-Unc Info-Det
Constant −4049∗∗ −4017 −3013 −21029∗∗∗
420295 420675 430225 470055
W_Entitle 5066 4051∗ 4009 25024∗∗∗
430505 420715 460175 480965
L_Entitle 1036 2030 3053 15059
410975 440135 480435 4110305
Log-L −2301 −2000 −1309 −601
Wald 2 2095 3014 1096 11086
N 43 34 36 35
Note. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
that this result is solely driven by a single outlying
observation.19 We, therefore, refrain from drawing
conclusions from this result.
Across treatments, entitlements have a strong differ-
ential effect on the likelihood that agreements deviate
from the equal split. Probit regressions in Table 7 show
this. In the Info-Det treatment, subjective entitlements
of winners have a strong influence on the occurrence
of deviations from the equal split, whereas there is no
significant effect in the Info-Unc treatment. Comparing
both Info treatments shows a significant difference in
the effect of winner entitlements (p= 00050) but not
of loser entitlements (p= 00389). In the Noinfo-Det
treatment, winner entitlements are significant at 10%,
but this is driven by the same outlying observation as
for agreed shares. Moreover, comparisons of the winner
entitlement effect between both Noinfo treatments do
not show a significant difference (p = 00793), whereas
the effect in the Info-Det treatment is significantly
stronger than in the Noinfo-Det treatment (p = 00040).
Overall the reported evidence shows that, with
performance information, entitlements have a strong
level effect irrespective of the production process.
For a marginal effect of entitlements to emerge, both
performance information and deterministic production
are necessary preconditions.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we explore, first, the effect of differences in
performance information and the process in producing
a joint surplus on subjective entitlements derived from
19 In this pair the “winner” stated an extreme entitlement of
W_Entitle = 00996 (the “loser’s” entitlement was reasonable with
L_Entitle = 00631) and was obviously ready to defend it. This led to
a concession of only 8709 (treatment average: 49207), a duration of
598 seconds (treatment average: 271 seconds), and an agreement in
favor of the winner of 00812 (treatment average: 00511).
the production process and, second, the effect of these
entitlements on bargaining over the produced surplus.
There is no doubt that in our experiment participants
derive subjective entitlements from the performance
task. These entitlements are significantly affected by
the (in)existence of performance information, whereas
the (in)existence of production uncertainties has a
much less pronounced effect. The derived entitlements
impact all stages of bargaining and observed differ-
ences in entitlements are reflected by differences in the
bargaining process.
Without performance information, entitlements
mostly center around the equal split and are mostly
mutually consistent. Interestingly, entitlements are
found when considering beliefs about performance only
when production is deterministic. However, such beliefs
seem not to influence bargaining (except for opening
proposals) because in the absence of performance infor-
mation all agreements are on or close to the equal split.
Further, negotiators make relatively large and early
concessions and reach agreements relatively quickly.
Overall, given the little variation in entitlements it is
unsurprising that there is no strong correlation between
entitlements and bargaining behavior.
In stark contrast, with performance information,
subjective entitlements are clearly skewed toward the
better performer and mostly mutually inconsistent.
These entitlements are economically relevant because
they significantly influence opening proposals, con-
cessions, bargaining duration, and final agreements.
We find this effect of performance information to be
strong although negotiators learn only whether they
are better or worse performing. In comparison to when
entitlements are made specific and quantifiable (as, e.g.,
in Gächter and Riedl 2005), such coarse performance
information should make it harder for bargainers to
derive entitlements and use them as an anchor for
bargaining behavior. Moreover, our subjects correctly
predicted that even the better performers would not do
very well in absolute terms, which also should work
against the emergence of subjective entitlements. We
nevertheless observe them, and their impact on bar-
gaining behavior shows that subjective entitlements can
be important even under circumstances unfavorable to
their emergence.
The economic importance of subjective entitlements
in bargaining is also corroborated by the fact that
entitlements affect bargaining even when there are
relatively large uncertainties regarding the translation
of performance into surplus. Specifically, we see that
production uncertainties affect the bargaining process,
but we do not find that they strongly mitigate the
effect of entitlements. Overall, our findings show that
negotiators derive subjective entitlements from perfor-
mance information, which affects bargaining because
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This observation is also consistent with the casual
evidence of our motivating examples, presented in §1.
In the investigated bargaining environment, the
existence of entitlements is closely related to perfor-
mance information. Yet, the significant marginal effect
of entitlements for given performance information
strongly suggests that entitlements as such are the
force behind bargaining behavior. If this indeed holds,
then entitlements may be manipulated to influence
the bargaining process and outcome, independent of
the actual performance of the involved negotiators.
Such strategic use and manipulation of entitlements via
private or public information channels, for example,
could be important in many bargaining-like situations,
from client–customer relations to union–firm wage
bargaining to even political negotiations, and may be
an interesting area of future research.
Our experimental results also speak to and inform
theoretical bargaining models that assume reference
points or reference-dependent preferences (Kahneman
and Tversky 1979). As discussed in §3, some coopera-
tive bargaining models with reference points (Gupta
and Livne 1988) and recent models incorporating fair-
ness principles in the bargaining process (Birkeland
and Tungodden 2014) predict agreements that deviate
from the equal split. This prediction is consistent with
the skewed distribution of agreements observed in
our experiment. These models are mostly silent about
origins of the reference points and fairness principles,
respectively. We show that they can be attributed to
subjective entitlements that bargaining parties derive
from their relative performance in a joint production
process. Hence, reference points and fairness princi-
ples and their effect on the bargaining process and
agreements should be viewed as endogenous to the
economic environment. In addition, salient factors of
that environment (e.g., performance information and
production uncertainties) can modulate bargaining
outcomes and should be taken into account when
modeling negotiations.
Compte and Jehiel (2003) and Li (2007) model bar-
gaining as a process where negotiators use reference
points derived from past proposals when evaluat-
ing offers (see also Hyndman 2011). Their models
can capture the facts that bargaining agreements are
seldom immediate and that bargaining is gradual,
and they formalize the idea that it may be risky to
start bargaining with too generous offers. We indeed
observe gradual bargaining and strategically low open-
ing offers. However, we also see that opening proposals,
concessions, and bargaining duration are related to
subjective entitlements. On top of that, gradual conces-
sions, delays in agreement, and last-minute agreements
are not equally distributed in all of our treatments.
Specifically, with no performance information, most
negotiators quickly agree on the equal split because
asymmetric entitlements are hard to defend in that
case. This suggests that bargaining behavior should
not only be modeled as reference dependent in the
sense that preferences are influenced by bargaining
history but also be modeled as dependent on subjective
entitlements and factors influencing them, which may
be independent of bargaining history.
Theoretical bargaining models and bargaining exper-
iments have greatly improved our understanding of
how negotiations work. However, many aspects of
bargaining are still not well understood. Our study pro-
vides insight about the role of performance information,
production uncertainty, and subjective entitlements
in bargaining. Perhaps more importantly, though, the
sketched theoretical approaches to bargaining that use
reference dependence, together with our experimental
evidence on the emergence and influence of subjective
entitlements, may provide a fertile ground for more
theoretical and experimental research furthering our
knowledge of bargaining behavior.
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Appendix. Detailed Analysis of Marginal
Effects of Entitlements
In this appendix we present the regression analyses investi-
gating the marginal effect of entitlements on opening offers,
concessions, and bargaining duration that are more informally
presented in the main text.
A.1. Opening Offers
Table A.1 reports the results of Tobit regressions for each
treatment, where the independent variable Entitle stands for
the entitlement claimed by and ascribed to the winner, by the
winner and the loser, respectively.20 In both treatments with
performance information, opening proposals are significantly
20 To save space, we report the pooled data for winners and losers here.
Results from regressions run separately for winners and losers show
similar patterns and are reported in §S1.1 of the online appendix. In
addition, in §S1.5 of the online appendix we report results of regressions
run with added individual characteristics as control variables. In these
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Table A.1 Opening Proposals as a Function of Subjective Entitlements
in Each Treatment
Dependent variable: Opening proposal 4winner share5
Independent
variables Noinfo-Unc Noinfo-Det Info-Unc Info-Det
Constant 00715∗∗∗ 00520∗∗∗ −00272 00054
4002415 4001155 4001825 4001395
Entitle −00400 00040 10457∗∗∗ 00956∗∗∗
4004375 4002075 4003085 4002365
Log-L 23049 32059 26060 20076
F 0084 0004 22044 16035
N 43 35 37 37
Note. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.
∗∗∗Indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
and positively affected by subjective entitlements. The esti-
mated coefficient of Entitle is statistically insignificantly larger
in the Info-Unc treatment than in the Info-Det treatment
(p = 00196).21 Without performance information, entitlements
do not play a significant role for opening offers (p ≥ 00365).
A.2. Concessions and Bargaining Duration
When testing for a potential marginal effect of entitlements
on concessions and bargaining duration we use a variable
measuring the tension in entitlements between the loser
and the winner in a bargaining pair. Formally, it is defined
as the difference in subjective entitlements between win-
ners (W_Entitle) and losers (L_Entitle) in each bargaining
pair: ã_Entitle 2= W_Entitle − L_Entitle (see also Gächter and
Riedl 2005).
Our concession measure incorporates a potential influence
of opening proposals by definition, because concessions
are defined relative to bargaining areas that are given by
standing proposals. To control for opening offers in the
bargaining duration regression, we use the variable ã_First,
which stands for the difference in the first proposal and first
counterproposal in a bargaining pair.
Tables A.2 and A.3 show the results of ordinary least-
squares (OLS) and Tobit regressions for concessions and
bargaining duration, respectively.22 As expected, in the
affect bargaining behavior: risk preferences, Machiavellianism, and,
respectively, gender of the bargainer and gender composition of the
bargaining pair. The regression results reported in the main text are
robust to adding these control variables.
21 Here and elsewhere, to test equality of coefficient estimates between
treatments, we pooled the data of the respective treatments and
added a dummy and an interaction variable to control for treatment
effects.
22 We use OLS estimates for concessions because our concession
measure is unbounded, and we use Tobit estimates for bargaining
duration, because it is bounded below by 0 and above by 600 seconds.
The differences in the numbers of observations between the two
regression tables are a result of pairs who did not reach an agreement
and are not taken into account in the bargaining duration regres-
sions. In addition, for some bargaining pairs the difference in first
(counter)proposals could not be calculated because not both sides in
the pair made a first (counter)proposal. We also run the bargaining
duration regressions with all pairs that reached an agreement but
without ã_First. The obtained coefficient estimates for ã_Entitle are
qualitatively the same.
Table A.2 Concessions as a Function of Tension in Subjective
Entitlements in Each Treatment (OLS Regressions)
Dependent variable: Concessions
Independent
variables Noinfo-Unc Noinfo-Det Info-Unc Info-Det
Constant 53901∗∗∗ 49706∗∗∗ 43403∗∗∗ 27901∗∗∗
464055 461085 4100065 449015
ã_Entitle 23900 −81303∗ −1183902∗∗ −76305∗∗∗
4390035 4434085 4768005 4256045
R2 000058 000489 000526 001123
F 0037 3050 5073 8087
N 43 35 37 37
Note. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
Table A.3 Bargaining Duration as a Function of Tension in Subjective
Entitlements in Each Treatment (Tobit Regressions)
Dependent variable: Bargaining duration
Independent
variables Noinfo-Unc Noinfo-Det Info-Unc Info-Det
Constant 17905∗∗∗ 28005∗∗∗ 25705∗∗∗ 47200∗∗∗
450015 458065 457095 446005
ã_First 66604∗∗ 38704∗∗∗ 12000 18805∗∗
4266055 4122005 4250015 490075
ã_Entitle −3305 38104 1176509∗∗∗ 19408
4266085 4281045 4384035 4266095
Log-L −24804 −16007 −22905 −19506
F 3078 7044 12076 2019
N 38 24 35 33
Note. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.
∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respec-
tively.
Noinfo-Unc treatment, entitlements do not affect conces-
sions. With no performance information but deterministic
production (Noinfo-Det), a higher tension in entitlements
decreases concessions at the 10% significance level. The dif-
ference between the two treatments is significant at p = 00076.
It is tempting to interpret this as entitlements influencing
concessions even if bargainers do not know their relative per-
formance. Closer inspection, however, reveals that this result
is driven by a single outlying observation.23 We, therefore,
refrain from putting much emphasis on this result because it
may represent a “false positive.”
When performance information is available, a larger ten-
sion in entitlements significantly weakens concessions made
in a bargaining pair. The effect is statistically insignificantly
stronger when there is noise in the production process (Info-
Unc) than when production is deterministic (Info-Det)
(p = 00188).
The effects of entitlements on concessions are largely
mirrored by the effects of entitlements on bargaining dura-
tion (Table A.3). Without performance information, tensions
23 In this pair the “winner” stated an extreme entitlement of
W_Entitle = 00996 (the “loser’s” entitlement was reasonable with
L_Entitle = 00631) and was obviously ready to defend it. This led to
a concession of only 8709 (treatment average: 49207), a duration of
598 seconds (treatment average: 271 seconds), and an agreement in
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in entitlements do not significantly affect bargaining dura-
tion, irrespective of the production process. The estimated
coefficients do not significantly differ between these two
treatments (p = 00283). With performance information and
noisy production (Info-Unc), tensions in entitlements sig-
nificantly increase the time until an agreement is reached,
whereas this is only insignificantly the case for determin-
istic production (Info-Det). The difference in coefficient
estimates of ã_Entitle is significant (p = 00001) between these
two treatments. It is important to note that in the Info-Det
treatment the coefficient estimate of ã_First is significantly
positive but insignificant in the Info-Unc treatment. Together
with the already established result of significant effects of
entitlements on opening proposals in the Info-Det treat-
ment (see Table A.1), this points toward an indirect effect of
entitlements on bargaining duration in this treatment.
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